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We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the neoclassical growth model
under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested
politician who cannot commit to policies. Citizens can imperfectly control the politician
using elections similar to a political agency model. As in the standard dynamic taxa-
tion models, we only allow for linear taxes on capital and labor income. The celebrated
Chamley-Judd result shows that, with a benevolent government that has full commitment
power, long-run capital taxes should be equal to zero. We show that, as long as the dis-
count factor of the politician is equal to or greater than that of the citizens, the same result
holds in an environment where the government is controlled by a self-interested politician
and there is no commitment to policies. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than
the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens
involves long-run capital taxation.
JEL Classi￿cation: H11, H21, E61, P16.
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Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) summarize the main result of the Ramsey par-
adigm of dynamic optimal taxation￿ taxing capital income is a bad idea. When
taxes on labor and capital are restricted to be linear and when the government
is benevolent and can commit to a complete sequence of tax policies, Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) result holds￿ the optimal dynamic tax sequence involves
zero capital taxes in the long run. The result is surprisingly general and robust in
a variety of settings, including models with human capital accumulation (Jones,
Manuelli, and Rossi, 1997), models where capital-holders are distinct from work-
ers (Judd, 1985), and certain overlapping generations models (Atkeson, Chari, and
Kehoe, 1999, Garriga, 2001, and Erosa and Gervais, 2002). Similar results hold
in stochastic versions of the neoclassical growth model (e.g., Zhu, 1992, Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe, 1994) and most quantitative investigations suggest that
capital taxes should be zero or very small even in the short run (e.g., Atkeson,
Chari, and Kehoe, 1999).1 These prescriptions of the Ramsey taxation are used
to guide policy not only in developed countries but also around the world.
An obvious shortcoming of this paradigm, and of the results that it implies, is
that, in practice, taxes are not set by benevolent governments, but by politicians
who have objectives di⁄erent from citizens. Moreover, these politicians are typi-
cally unable to commit to complete sequences of future taxes. These two frictions,
self-interest and lack of commitment, are at the center of many political economy
models (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2004, Besley and Coate, 1998) and are
also the cornerstone of the public choice theory (see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock,
1962). From a practical viewpoint, it then seems natural to expect that these
frictions should also a⁄ect equilibrium taxes and what types of tax structures are
feasible. A major question for the analysis of dynamic ￿scal policy is whether the
key conclusions of the Ramsey paradigm generalize to more realistic environments
with self-interested politicians and no commitment. This paper presents a simple
answer to this question.
The answer has two parts. First, our analysis reveals a simple but intuitive
economic mechanism that makes positive capital taxes optimal from the viewpoint
of the citizens; positive capital taxes reduce capital accumulation and thus the
incentives of politicians to deviate from the policies favored by the citizens. Thus,
starting from an undistorted allocation a small increase in capital taxes is typically
bene￿cial because it relaxes the political economy constraints. Second, despite this
￿rst-order e⁄ect, we show that the result that capital taxes should be equal to zero
in the long run generalizes to some political economy environments. That is, even
1A notable exception is the New Dynamic Public Finance literature, which studies dynamic
nonlinear taxes and characterizes conditions under which capital taxes need to be positive to pro-
vide intertemporal incentives to individuals with private information (see, e.g., Golosov, Kocher-
lakota and Tsyvinski 2003, Kocherlakota, 2005, Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning, 2006).
1when taxes are set by self-interested politicians with no commitment power to
future tax sequences, the best sustainable equilibrium may involve zero taxes. In
particular, we delineate precise conditions under which capital taxes are positive
in the (best) subgame perfect equilibrium of the political economy environment we
specify, but then limit to zero in the long run. Conversely, when these conditions
are not satis￿ed, capital taxes are positive and in the long run, thus presenting a
possible explanation for the ubiquity of capital taxes in practice.
More speci￿cally, we model the political economy of taxation using a version of
the political agency models by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In this model,
taxes are the outcome of a dynamic game between politicians and citizens. While
politicians have the power to set taxes, they are potentially controlled by the citi-
zens, who can remove them from power using elections or other means. We analyze
a neoclassical growth model, where self-interested politicians decide on linear taxes
on labor and capital income and manage government debt. The amount that is
left after servicing debt and ￿nancing public goods constitutes the rents for the
politician in power. The interactions between citizens and politicians de￿ne a dy-
namic game. We characterize the best subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this
game from the viewpoint of the citizens.2 We show that this problem is similar
to the dynamic taxation problems in the literature except for the addition of a
sequence of sustainability constraints for politicians, which ensure that politicians
are willing to choose a particular sequence of capital and labor income taxes.
Our ￿rst result is that despite the self-interested objectives (rent-seeking be-
havior) of politicians and the lack of commitment to future policies, the best equi-
librium will involve zero capital taxes as in the celebrated Chamley-Judd result,
provided that politicians have a discount factor equal to or greater than that of
the citizens. The intuition for this result is that the society can structure dynamic
incentives to politicians in such a way that, in the long-run, rents to the politicians
can be provided in a non-distortionary way. This result shows that the Chamley-
Judd conclusion concerning the desirability of zero capital taxes in the long run
has wider applicability than previously considered.
Our second result, however, delineates a speci￿c reason for why positive cap-
ital taxes might be desirable. If politicians are more impatient than the citizens
(which may be a better approximation to reality than the politicians having the
same patience as the citizens, for example, because of exogenous turnover), the
best equilibrium involves long-run capital taxes as well as additional distortions
on labor supply. The reason for the presence of positive long-run capital taxation
in this case is that, when politicians have a lower discount factor than the citi-
2Our focus on the best SPE is motivated by our attempt understand what the best feasible tax
structures will be in the presence of political economy and no commitment constraints. Naturally,
the dynamic game we specify has other equilibria, and many of these exhibit greater ine¢ ciencies
than the best SPE characterized here. We believe that focusing on the best SPE highlights the
dynamic economic forces a⁄ecting capital taxes in the clearest possible way.
2zens, the political sustainability constraint remains binding even asymptotically.
This increases the marginal cost of saving (and also of supplying labor for the cit-
izens) because any increase in output must now also be accompanied with greater
payments to politicians to provide them with the appropriate incentives. Intu-
itively, starting from a situation with no distortions (and zero capital taxes), an
increase in capital taxation has a second-order e⁄ect on the welfare of the citizens
holding politician rents constant, but reduces the capital stock of the economy
and thus the rents that should be provided to politicians by a ￿rst-order amount.
Consequently, positive capital taxes will be bene￿cial to citizens when political sus-
tainability constraints are binding. It is also important to emphasize that such an
allocation indeed requires distortionary taxes. If capital taxes were equal to zero,
each individual would have an incentive to save more and the capital stock would
be too high relative to the one that maximizes the utility of the citizens. There-
fore, the ￿second-best allocation￿can be decentralized only by using distortionary
(linear) taxes.
Overall, our results suggest that the conclusions of the existing literature may
have wider applicability than the framework with benevolent government typically
considered in the literature. But, they also highlight a new reason for why positive
capital taxes might be useful, and thus suggest caution in applying these results
in practice, especially when politicians are short-sighted either because electoral
controls are imperfect or because of exogenous turnover or other reasons.
We should also note that the optimality of positive capital taxes even in the
long run is not an artifact of our model and re￿ ects concerns faced by real world
economic policy. In a politicial economy setup similar to ours, Caballero and Yared
(2008) provide a model and evidence of how rent-seeking politicians can a⁄ect the
composition of debt over the cycle and suggest that distortionary taxation may
be useful as a corrective device in such situations. Brennan and Buchanan (1980)
and Wilson (1989) argue for distortionary taxes to be used to curb the negative
political economy e⁄ects. Becker and Mulligan (2003) argue that ine¢ cient taxes
may be bene￿cial as a way of reducing excessive spending by politicians and provide
empirical evidence consistent with this view. Besley and Smart (2007) emphasize
the importance of ￿scal restraints in political agency models where politicians are
controlled by elections.
Our analysis builds on earlier work by Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993), who
study dynamic ￿scal policy as a game between a benevolent (potentially time-
inconsistent) government and citizens, and on Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2008a,b). Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) develop a general framework
for the analysis of government policy in the context of a dynamic game between
a self-interested government and citizens, but focus on situations in which there
are either no restrictions on tax policies or restrictions on taxes come only from
incentive compatibility constraints due to incomplete information. As a result,
3these papers do not directly make contact with the large body of work on dynamic
￿scal policy, which focuses on environments in which government is limited to linear
(distortionary) taxes. The current paper extends this framework and provides a
systematic analysis of how political economy constraints a⁄ect the optimality of
long-run capital taxes in the canonical Ramsey setup.
In addition to papers mentioned above, our work is also related to the recent
interesting paper by Yared (2008), which models dynamic ￿scal policy in a stochas-
tic general equilibrium framework. The main di⁄erence is that Yared￿ s analysis
does not incorporate capital. Our paper is also related to Benhabib and Rustichini
(1997) and to recent work by Reis (2007) on optimal policy with benevolent gov-
ernment without commitment.3 Recent work by Albanesi and Armenter (2007a,b)
provides a uni￿ed framework for the study of intertemporal distortions, though
they do not incorporate explicit political economy considerations. Other recent
work by Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2007a,b) studies the optimal taxation of
capital and optimal debt policy in a small open economy without commitment to
future policies, but once again without political economy considerations. Finally,
Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005) and Battaglini and Coate (2008)
also study the political economy of dynamic taxation, but focus on Markov Perfect
Equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
model and the characterization of equilibrium. It presents all of our main theoreti-
cal results. Section 3 illustrates these theoretical results using a simple quantitative
exercise. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model and Main Result
We start by setting up a neoclassical economy with Ramsey taxation closely fol-
lowing the standard treatment in Chari and Kehoe (1998). We then augment it
with the political economy setup of electoral accountability models in which the
politician cannot commit and is self interested.
Consider an in￿nite-horizon discrete-time economy populated by a continuum
of measure 1 of identical consumers with preferences
1 X
t=0
￿t [u(ct) ￿ h(lt)]; (1)
where c ￿ 0 denotes consumption, l ￿ 0 is labor supply, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the
discount factor of the citizens. Preferences are assumed to be separable for sim-
3There is also a large quantitative literature on time-inconsistent tax policies with benevolent
politicians (social planners). For example, Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2007) focus on time con-
sistent Markovian equilibria, while Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) study more general sustainable
equilibria in such environments.
4plicity. We make the standard assumptions on preferences that u : R+ ! R+
and h : R+ ! R+ are twice continuously di⁄erentiable, with derivatives u0 (￿) and
h0 (￿), are strictly increasing; u(￿) is strictly concave and h(￿) is strictly convex. In
addition, we impose the following standard Inada conditions on preferences:
1. liml!0 h0 (l) = 0. Moreover, there exists some ￿ L 2 (0;1) such that liml!￿ L h0 (l) =
1. This feature implies that the marginal disutility of labor becomes arbi-
trarily large when individuals supply the maximum amount of labor, ￿ L.
2. limc!0 u0 (c) = 1 and limc!1 u0 (c) = 0.
These assumptions ensure interior solutions for c and l.
We use subscript i to denote an individual citizen and designate the set of
citizens by I. Each citizen starts with an identical initial endowment of capital
k0 = K0 at time t = 0. At time t, an amount of public goods gt needs to be
￿nanced, otherwise, production in the economy is equal to zero. For example, one
can think of the public goods gt as expenditure on infrastructure. When the nec-
essary amount of public goods is provided, the unique ￿nal good of the economy
can be produced via the aggregate production function F(K;L), where K ￿ 0 de-
notes the aggregate capital stock, and L ￿ 0 denotes the aggregate labor provided
by all the citizens. We assume that F is strictly increasing and concave in both
of its arguments, continuously di⁄erentiable (with derivatives denoted by FK (￿;￿)
and FL (￿;￿)) and exhibits constant returns to scale. Throughout, to simplify no-
tation, we interpret F (￿;￿) as the production function inclusive of undepreciated
capital. Finally, we also assume that the aggregate production function satis￿es
the following natural requirements
a. there exists ￿ K < 1 such that F( ￿ K; ￿ L) < ￿ K. This assumption ensures that
the steady-state level of output has to be ￿nite (since by the concavity of F,
it also implies that F(K; ￿ L) < K for all K ￿ ￿ K);
b. FK (K;0) = 0 for all K. This assumption implies that when there is no
employment, the marginal product of capital is equal to 0.
Factor markets are competitive, and thus, as long as the necessary amount of
public good is provided, the wage rate and the interest rate (which is also the
rental rate of capital) at time t, wt and rt, satisfy
wt = FL (Kt;Lt) and rt = FK (Kt;Lt): (2)
The only tax instruments available to the government are linear taxes on capi-
tal, ￿k;t, and labor income, ￿l;t. The government can also use one-period non-state
contingent bonds for debt management (see below). Taxation and debt manage-
ment decisions at time t are made by the politician in power. There is a set I of
5potential politicians with identical preferences de￿ned on their own consumption,




where v (￿) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously di⁄erentiable,
with v(0) = 0. Note that the discount factor of politicians, ￿ 2 (0;1), is potentially
di⁄erent from that of the citizens, ￿.
Denote by ￿t 2 f0;1g whether the government will supply the necessary public
goods. Restricting this choice of ￿t to f0;1g is without loss of any generality,
since anything less than the full amount of necessary public good provision leads
to the same outcome (lack of production). Let bt 2 R be the debt level of the
government at time t (at date t prices), qt+1 ￿ 0 denote the price of date t + 1
government bonds at time t, and ￿t 2 f0;1g denote the debt default decision of
the government, with ￿t = 0 corresponding to default at time t (which is feasible
only when bt > 0, that is, when the government is indebted at time t). Since the
population is normalized to 1, all quantities here stand both for aggregates and
per capita levels.
The consumption of the politician, xt, net debt payments, and government ex-
penditures must be ￿nanced by taxation and new debt issuance, so the government
budget constraint must be satis￿ed at all t:
xt + ￿tgt + ￿tbt ￿ ￿k;trtKt + ￿l;twtLt + qt+1bt+1 (4)
The left-hand side of (4) corresponds to the outlays of the government at time t,
while the right-hand side denotes the revenues resulting from taxation of capital
and labor income and issuance of new debt.
We introduce the default decision to ensure that (4) does not become infeasible
along o⁄ equilibrium paths. Notice also that government debt bt is not speci￿c
to a politician. If the politician in power does not default on government debt
at time t, but is replaced, the next politician will start period t + 1 with debt
obligations bt+1. Throughout, we also take the sequence of necessary public good
expenditures fgtg
1
t=0 as given and assume that this sequence is such that it is
feasible to have ￿t = 1 for all t (this assumption will be stated as a part of the
relevant propositions below). Otherwise, the economy would shut down at some
point and would produce zero output thereafter.
At any point of time one politician is in power. Citizens decide whether to keep
the politician in power or replace him with a new one using elections.4 Speci￿cally,
the timing of moves in each period is as follows.
4Since all citizens have the same preferences regarding politician behavior, we assume that
they will all vote unanimously on replacement decisions. See Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2008a) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4) for further discussion of various decision-
making processes that citizens can use for replacing politicians.
61. At the beginning of period t; each citizen i 2 I chooses labor supply li;t ￿
0 and the output is being produced according to F (Kt;Lt), where Kt ￿ R
i2I ki;tdi and Lt ￿
R
i2I li;tdi, where ki;t ￿ 0 denotes the capital holding of
agent i 2 I at time t. Citizen i receives factor payments wtli;t and rtki;t,
with wt and rt as given in (2).
2. The politician in power chooses linear taxes on capital ￿k;t and labor ￿l;t;
0 ￿ ￿k;t;￿l;t ￿ 1, and makes the decisions on public good provision, ￿t 2
f0;1g, and default, ￿t 2 f0;1g. In addition, he announces a price qt+1 ￿ 0
for the next period￿ s government bonds at which an unlimited amount of
bonds can be purchased or sold by the citizens. Given these choices, the
politician￿ s consumption level xt ￿ 0 is determined from the government
budget constraint (4) (if this constraint has no solution with xt ￿ 0 and
￿t = 1, then necessarily ￿t = 0).
3. Given the politician￿ s actions f￿k;t;￿l;t;qt;xt;￿t;￿t;qt+1g,5 each citizen i 2 I
chooses consumption, ci;t ￿ 0, and capital and government bond holdings for
the next period, ki;t+1 ￿ 0 and bi;t+1, subject to the individual ￿ ow budget
constraint
ci;t + ki;t+1 + qt+1bi;t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l;t)wtli;t + (1 ￿ ￿k;t)rtki;t + ￿tbi;t: (5)
The right-hand side of this equation includes the individual￿ s total income,
comprising labor and capital income net of taxes and government bond pay-
ments. The left-hand side is the total expenditure of the individual at date
t. We also impose the standard no Ponzi condition on individuals￿ requiring
their lifetime budget constraints to be satis￿ed￿ for the equilibrium sequence
of policies. Note, however, that if bi;t < 0, the lifetime budget constraint of in-
dividuals might be violated for some non-equilibrium future policy sequences
(despite the no Ponzi game condition). This can only be an issue when there
is a deviation from equilibrium policies, but we still need to specify how the
game proceeds if there is such a deviation. We assume that at any date t,
each individual must pay the minimum of bi;t or the net present value of
his income in the continuation game. This assumption ensures that lifetime
budget constraints are never violated.
4. Citizens decide whether to keep the current politician in power or replace
him, ￿t 2 f0;1g, with ￿t = 1 denoting replacement.
The history at every node of the game, ht, encodes all actions up to that
point. Throughout, we look at pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (SPE).
5Throughout, we refer to the tuple f￿k;t;￿l;t;xt;￿t;￿t;qt+1g as policies or politician￿ s actions.
The sequence fgtg
1
t=0 is taken as given and we do not explicitly mention it as part of the policies.
7A strategy pro￿le will constitute a SPE if each individual (citizen and politician)
plays a best response to all other strategies at each history ht.6 In addition, we will
focus on the SPE that maximizes citizens￿utility at time t = 0 and refer to this as
the best SPE. The focus on symmetric equilibria is to reduce notation (given the
concavity of the utility function in (1), it is clear that the best equilibrium will be
symmetric). The focus on the best equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens
is motivated by our desire to understand the structure of the best sustainable
allocations in an environment with self-interested politicians, i.e., to answer the
question of what the best allocations are if the political constraints are imposed.
The focus on the best SPE also makes our analysis comparable to the traditional
models that look for the utility-maximizing allocation from the viewpoint of the
citizens. Clearly, other equilibria will feature more ine¢ ciency than the best SPE.
From the strict concavity of individuals￿problem, it is clear that the best SPE
will be symmetric and we use this fact throughout to economize on notation. In




The ￿rst step in our analysis is to establish a connection between the SPE of
the game described here and competitive equilibria (given policies). In particular,
recall that even though there is a dynamic political game between the government
and the citizens, each individual makes his economic decisions competitively, that
is, taking prices as given.
De￿nition 1 For a given sequence of policies f￿k;t;￿l;t;xt;￿t;￿t;qt+1g
1
t=0, a com-
petitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations
n









^ ct;^ lt;^ bt;^ kt+1
o1
t=0
maximizes (1) subject to (5)
given f￿k;t;￿l;t;xt;￿t;￿t;qt+1g
1
t=0 and f^ rt; ^ wtg
1
t=0.
ii (market clearing) factor prices ^ wt and ^ rt are given by (2) evaluated at
Kt = ^ kt and Lt = ^ lt at each t.
iii (government budget constraint) the government budget constraint (4) is
satis￿ed at each t.
iv (feasibility) the feasibility constraint
^ ct + ^ xt + ￿tgt + ^ kt+1 ￿ F(^ kt;^ lt) (6)
is satis￿ed at each t.
6For a standard treatment of the SPE in a game between a government and a continuum of
citizens, see Chari and Kehoe (1990).
8Given the di⁄erentiability and the Inada-type assumptions imposed above, util-
ity maximization requirement of a competitive equilibrium implies that, as long as
￿t = 1, the following two ￿rst-order conditions must hold
(1 ￿ ￿l;t) ^ wtu0(^ ct) = h0(^ lt) and (1 ￿ ￿k;t)￿^ rtu0(^ ct) = u0(^ ct￿1): (7)
These are written for aggregates, suppressing the subscript i, for notational con-
venience. The ￿rst condition requires the marginal utility from an additional unit
of labor supply to be equal to the marginal disutility of labor, and the second is
the standard Euler equation for the marginal utility of consumption between two
periods. In addition, no arbitrage implies that whenever there is no default ￿￿
t = 1,
the value of holding capital and bonds must be the same, thus
(1 ￿ ￿k;t)^ rt = q￿1
t : (8)
If this condition did not hold, individuals would either not invest in physical cap-
ital or not hold any government bonds (since one of the two assets would have a
higher certain rate of return than the other). Given the concavity of the utility-
maximization problem of the citizens, (7) and (8) are not only necessary but also
su¢ cient. In view of this, we can ￿rst state the following preliminary result con-
necting the SPE in which the government does not default and provides the public
good to a corresponding competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider any SPE f￿k;t;￿l;t;xt;￿t;￿t;￿t;ct;lt;qt+1;kt+1g
1
t=0 with





t=0, with associated prices frt;wtg
1






Proof. This result follows from the de￿nition of the competitive equilibrium,
De￿nition 1, the conditions on factor prices (2), the ￿rst order conditions on capi-
tal and labor (7), and the no-arbitrage condition (8). First, the SPE must satisfy
the feasibility condition, (6), by construction, thus the feasibility condition (iv) of
De￿nition 1, and it also satis￿es the government budget constraint (4) (with or
without ￿nancing of government expenditures, fgtg
1
t=0, since this is already spec-
i￿ed by the sequence f￿k;t;￿l;t;xt;￿t;￿t;￿t;ct;lt;bt;qt+1;kt+1g
1
t=0), so the govern-







t=0 must satisfy the ￿rst order
conditions on capital and labor (7) and fqt+1g
1
t=0 must satisfy the no-arbitrage
condition (8), since if this were not the case, there would exist some equilibrium-
path history ht, where an individual can deviate and improve his utility. Since (7)
and (8) are necessary and su¢ cient for utility-maximization, the utility maximiza-
tion condition in the competitive equilibrium (i) of De￿nition 1 is also satis￿ed,
completing the proof.
9To make further progress, we use the standard technique in dynamic ￿scal
policy analysis of representing a competitive equilibrium subject to taxes by intro-
ducing an implementability constraint (e.g., Chari and Kehoe, 1998, or Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2004). This primal approach has the advantage of turning the gov-
ernment (politician) maximization problem into one of choosing allocations rather
than taxes.
Proposition 2 Take the initial capital tax rate ￿k;0 2 [0;1), the initial capital
stock k0 ￿ 0, and the initial government bond holdings b0 as given. Suppose that
￿t = ￿t = 1 for all t. Then, the sequence
n




equilibrium for some fxt;gtg
1
















Proof. Substitute the necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-order conditions for utility
maximization given in (7) into the individual budget constraint, (5), and rearrange
to achieve the required implementability constraint (9). If this condition were not
satis￿ed, it would imply that either at some t, utility-maximization fails or the
individual budget constraint is not satis￿ed.
Given Proposition 2, the traditional analysis of optimal ￿scal policy proceeds to
￿nd a sequence of allocation and the associated taxes that maximize the utility of
the citizens while generating su¢ cient revenue to ￿nance gt. In our environment
with political economy constraints, there are two crucial di⁄erences. First, the
best SPE must also raise additional resources to ￿nance government (politician)
consumption, xt. In particular, it is straightforward that if we chose xt = 0 for all
t, the politician in power would be better o⁄ taxing capital and labor at a very
high rate and consuming the proceeds today and then being replaced. Second, and
related to the previous point, we must make sure that the politician in power never
￿nds it bene￿cial to deviate from the implicitly-chosen sequence of allocations.
This will be done by introducing another sequence of constraints, the political
sustainability constraints. The previous argument already suggests what form
these sustainability constraints should take. At any point in time, the politician in
power can always deviate to ￿l;t = ￿k;t = 1, collect all production as tax revenue,
and consume all the proceeds. The worst subgame perfect punishment that the
citizens can impose is to replace the politician. After replacement, we assume that
the politician receives zero consumption and obtains per period utility v (0) = 0
in all future dates.7 By the standard arguments in dynamic and repeated games
7The alternative would be to allow the politician to save and achieve consumption smoothing
after the replacement. Whether or not we allow the politician to save after replacement has no
e⁄ect on our results.
10(e.g., Abreu, 1988), it is su¢ cient to look at this worst punishment to characterize
the best SPE. This best deviation for the politician combined with the worst
punishment on the side of the citizens implies that the sustainability constraint at
time t should take the form
1 X
s=0
￿sv(xt+s) ￿ v(F(kt;lt)): (10)
We next show that (10) is in fact the relevant sustainability constraint. In
particular, the next proposition proofs that if the best allocation subject to (10)
involves the provision of the public good in all periods, then the best SPE will in-
volve no replacement of the initial politician and no default, and can be character-
ized as a solution to a simple maximization problem with (10) as the sustainability
constraint.
Proposition 3 Suppose that given the sequence fgtg
1
t=0, any solution to the max-
imization of (1), subject to the feasibility constraint, (6), the implementability con-
straint (9), and the political sustainability constraint (10) involves provision of the















also involves no replacement of the initial politician, public good provision in all
periods and no default at all times (that is, ￿￿
t = 0 and ￿￿
t = ￿￿
t = 1 for all t) along
the equilibrium path. This best SPE can be characterized as maximizing the utility
of the citizens (1), subject to the feasibility constraint, (6), the implementability
constraint (9), and the political sustainability constraint (10).
Proof. First, note that by the argument preceding the sustainability constraint
(10), this equation is a necessary condition, since otherwise the politician can im-
prove his utility by deviating. Moreover, the feasibility constraint (6) is necessary
by De￿nition 1 and implementability constraint (9) is necessary by Proposition 2.
Therefore, the best SPE cannot give higher utility to citizens than the maximiza-
tion of the citizen￿ s utility (1), subject to feasibility (6), implementability (9), and
sustainability (10). This can be achieved with no replacement of the politician,
with no default and with the required public good provision at all dates.
We next prove that actions ￿￿
t = 0, ￿￿
t = ￿￿
t = 1 for all t are necessarily
part of the best SPE. To do this, let us ￿rst suppose that there exists a best
SPE that implements the maximization of (1), subject to (6), (9), and (10). Let

















will then show that ￿￿
t = 0, ￿￿
t = ￿￿
t = 1, so the best SPE involves no political
replacement, no default, and involves public good provision along the equilibrium
path.
Now, to obtain a contradiction, suppose that the best SPE involves politician
replacement along the equilibrium path. Then, the initial politician must be re-
placed after some equilibrium-path history ^ ht (even though he has not deviated).
11At time t this politician is in power and pursues a policy that maximizes (1),
subject to (6), (9), and (10). This implies that at t, ￿￿
t = ￿￿
t = 1 and the politi-
cian￿ s sustainability constraint, (10), holds. Hence, the utility of the politician at
time t must be at least v (F (k￿
t;l￿
t)). In particular, let us write the utility of this
politician as
V (k￿






￿ v (F (k￿
t;l￿
t)); (11)






is the continuation utility of this politician, but since there is re-





= 0. After replacement, the


















so that the sustainability constraint (10) for this new politician is satis￿ed. Now
consider the following variation: do not replace the initial politician at ^ ht and
provide him with exactly the same continuation allocation as the new politician.
By construction (and by the fact that all politicians are identical), this variation
satis￿es (10) after ^ ht. Now, the time t utility of the initial politician after this
variation is given as
V A (k￿
t) ￿ v (x￿




> v (F (k￿
t;l￿
t));










= 0. But this implies that with this variation, the sustainability con-
straint, (10), for the initial politician at time t holds as strict inequality, thus x￿
t can
be reduced and c￿















could not have been a solution to the problem of maximizing (1), subject to (6),
(9), and (10), yielding a contradiction and establishing the claim that the best
SPE must involve ￿￿
t = 0 for all t.
To see that the best SPE involves no default, suppose that ￿￿
t = 0 and b￿
t > 0 (if
b￿
t ￿ 0, ￿t = 0 is not allowed). Then, there exists no price qt at which individuals
would buy bonds in the previous period t ￿ 1, thus the allocation must have zero
bonds, b￿
t = 0, which implies that ￿￿
t = 1. This contradiction establishes that
￿￿
t = 1 for all t. That the best SPE involves public good provision at all dates
is also straightforward by the hypothesis of the proposition (that any solution to
maximizing (1), subject to (6), (9), and (10) involves ￿t = 1).
To complete the proof, we only need to show that the maximization of (1), sub-
ject to (6), (9), and (10) is a SPE. This follows straightforwardly from Proposition
1 and the fact that replacing a politician that has deviated from the implicitly-
agreed tax sequence is a best response for the citizens given the history ht up to
12that point. To see this, consider the following strategy pro￿le; after a deviation
the politician will always play ￿0
k;t = ￿0
l;t = 1 for all t. This is a best response for
the politician anticipating replacement at each date after deviation, and given this
strategy by politicians, replacement after deviation is indeed a best response for
the citizens.
We now can state and prove our main result, which characterizes the time path
of taxes corresponding to the best SPE.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the maximization of (1), subject to the feasibility
constraint, (6), the implementability constraint (9), and the political sustainabil-
ity constraint (10) involves ￿t = 1 for all t, that fgtg
1
t=0 converges to some
























t=0 converges to a steady state ￿
cS;lS;bS;kS￿
. Then we have that:
1. if the politicians are as patient as, or relatively more patient than, the citi-
zens, i.e., if ￿ ￿ ￿, then the sustainability constraint (10) becomes slack as
t ! 1, and we have that limt!1 ￿￿
k;t = 0;
2. if the politicians are relatively less patient than the citizens, i.e., if ￿ < ￿,
then the sustainability constraint (10) binds as t ! 1, and limt!1 ￿￿
k;t > 0.









is a solution to maximization of (1) subject to (6), (9) and (10). Write the La-
grangian for this problem and let ￿t￿t ￿ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier on the
feasibility constraint (6), ￿ on the implementability constraint (9) and  t ￿ 0 on
the participation constraint (10).
Di⁄erentiating the Lagrangian implies that the ￿rst-order necessary conditions









































Note that by de￿nition, the multiplier on the implementability constraint, ￿, must
be ￿nite. From (12) it follows that there exists limt!1 ￿t = ￿S < 1, because
limt!1 c￿
t is assumed to exist, and Inada conditions ensure that it is ￿nite since
the steady-state output is ￿nite, and u(￿) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
13(Part 1) First, suppose that the discount factors of the politician and the






Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that ￿￿t t does not converge to zero. We
know that x￿
t ! xS from the feasibility constraint (6), which in a best SPE is














t=0 converges to some steady
state gS. Moreover, clearly, limt!1
Pt
s=0 ￿￿s ! 1. Then it must be the case
that ￿t=v0(xS) ! 1. Since we proved that limt!1 ￿t = ￿S < 1, this is only
possible if xS ! 0. This implies that the sustainability constrain (10) is violated
for su¢ ciently large t, unless F (k￿
t;l￿
t) ! 0 (i.e., F
￿
kS;lS￿
= 0). But the latter
would imply that ￿t goes to 0 in ￿nite time (since gS > 0). By hypothesis, the
maximization of (1) subject to (6), (9) and (10) yields a solution with ￿t > 0 for
all t. Consequently, the above-described allocation cannot be a best SPE, yielding
a contradiction. We therefore conclude that ￿￿t t ! 0. Thus, as t ! 1, (10)
becomes asymptotically slack.
Let us next take the limit as t ! 1 in (12), (13) and (14). Using the fact that















￿S = ￿S￿FK(kS;lS): (18)
Equations (16) and (17) imply that ￿S > 0. To see this, recall that ￿S ￿ 0,
because it is the multiplier on the resource constraint. To obtain a contradiction
to the claim that ￿S > 0, suppose that ￿S = 0. Then, since h0 > 0 and h00 > 0,
(17) implies that ￿ 2 (￿1;0). However, since u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, (16) cannot be
satis￿ed with ￿ 2 (￿1;0) and ￿S = 0. This yields a contradiction and establishing





t) = 1: (19)
Then, (7) combined with (19) implies that limt!1 ￿￿
k;t = 0, completing the proof
of Part 1 when ￿ = ￿.
Next consider the case where ￿ > ￿. Since
Pt
s=0 ￿t￿s=￿t s >
Pt
s=0 ￿￿s s, the
same argument as above establishes that ￿￿t t ! 0 and therefore (19) must hold
and thus limt!1 ￿￿
k;t exists and is equal to 0. This completes the proof of Part 1.
14(Part 2). Now consider the case where ￿ < ￿. By the hypothesis that a steady
state exists, (12) implies that ￿t ! ￿S. First, to obtain a contradiction, suppose





















+ ::: +  t￿￿t
)
:
Since  s ￿ 0 for all s, ￿S = 0 implies that each term in the summation in the
second line must go to zero as t ! 1. Therefore, ￿￿t t ! 0. Then, as t ! 1,
(16) and (17) again hold with ￿S = 0, and the same argument as in Part 1 yield a
contradiction and establishes that ￿S > 0. By the hypothesis that a steady state
exists, we also have v0(xt) ! v0(xS) > 0 (since v0 (x) > 0 for all x). Combining
these two observations with (15), we conclude that
Pt
s=0 ￿t￿s s=￿t must converge
to a strictly positive constant (that is, limt!1
Pt
s=0 ￿t￿s s=￿t = ￿ > 0).
Next, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that ￿￿t t ! 0. This means that for
any " > 0 there exists T < 1 such that for all t ￿ T, we have ￿￿t t < ". Take












































where the ￿rst inequality exploits the fact that ￿￿t t < " for all t > T and the
second line uses the fact that the sum in square brackets is less than 1=(1 ￿ ￿=￿).
Next, observe that for t su¢ ciently large, the expression in the curly brackets is
arbitrarily small. Therefore, for su¢ ciently large t, we have
Pt
s=0 ￿t￿s s=￿t <
2"=(1 ￿ ￿=￿). Since " is arbitrary, we have
Pt
s=0 ￿t￿s s=￿t ! 0, which yields
a contradiction to the hypothesis that limt!1
Pt
s=0 ￿t￿s s=￿t = ￿ > 0. This
establishes that ￿￿t t does not converge to 0. Then, combining (12), (14) and
(19) implies that limt!1 ￿￿
k;t also exists and limt!1 ￿￿
k;t > 0, completing the proof
of Part 2.
This proposition is the main result of our paper. The intuition for this result
is that, when ￿ = ￿ or when ￿ > ￿, the political sustainability constraints are
15present, but the best SPE involves backloading of the payments to politicians.8
This backloading (de￿ned in the right sense) ensures that the sustainability con-
straint of the politician will eventually become slack. As this happens, distortions,
and in particular distortions in saving decisions, disappear, and the corresponding
competitive equilibrium converges to zero capital taxes. Therefore, the ￿rst part
of this proposition shows that the Chamley-Judd results on zero capital taxes gen-
eralize to political economy environments where politicians are su¢ ciently patient.
The second part of the proposition, on the other hand, shows how positive cap-
ital taxes can arise as part of the best SPE. When politicians are more impatient
than the citizens, that is, when ￿ < ￿. As a result, the sustainability constraint,
(10), remains binding asymptotically. A binding sustainability constraint implies
that higher output must be associated with greater rents to politicians. This raises
the opportunity cost of increasing output for the citizens. In particular, reducing
the capital stock away from the ￿￿rst-best￿level weakens the deviation tempta-
tions of the politician and reduces the rents that needs to be paid in order to
ensure sustainability. Consequently, the best SPE involves lower savings than the
￿rst-best (the undistorted neoclassical growth model). It is also important to note
that these lower saving levels are decentralized by positive long-run capital taxes.
This follows from (7); if the economy had ￿k = 0, each individual would choose
the undistorted level of savings, leading either to the violation of the sustainability
constraint or to higher rents for politicians. Thus positive capital taxes are neces-
sary to ensure the appropriate level of capital accumulation and emerge as a tool
useful in maximizing the ex ante utility of the citizens in the presence of political
economy distortions.
The result in the ￿rst part of Proposition 4 is surprising. It suggests that the
conclusions of the existing literature that the capital tax is zero may have a wider
applicability than the framework with a benevolent government typically consid-
ered in the literature and applies, as in our paper, to a class of circumstances
in which the government is controlled by self-interested politicians without the
ability to commit to future taxes. Nevertheless, the second part of the proposi-
tion might ultimately be the more important result, since politicians being more
impatient (short-sighted) than the citizens is arguably a better approximation of
reality, particularly if there are exogenous reasons for which politicians lose power
(even if they do not deviate from the prescribed sequence of actions). In this light,
Proposition 4 suggests that considerable caution is necessary in using the norma-
tive benchmark of zero capital taxes emerging from models that ignore political
economy constraints.
8See Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) for further discussion of backloading in political
economy environments and Ray (2002) for a general treatment of backloading results in principal-
agent models.
163 Quantitative Investigation
In this section, we illustrate the results from the previous sections by computing the
equilibria of an example economy. Our purpose is not to undertake a quantitatively
plausible calibration, but to give further intuition for the theoretical results derived
in the previous section and to show how convergence to steady state takes place.
We consider the following speci￿cation of the economy. The instantaneous










where we take ￿ = 2 and ’ = 1. The discount factor of the citizens is taken as
￿ = 0:95.
The production function is
F(k;l) = Ak￿l1￿￿ + (1 ￿ d)k;
where A = 1, a = 1=3, and d = 1. We set the initial amount of capital to k0 = 0:1.
The instantaneous utility function of politicians is given by
v(x) = x￿g=￿g;
where ￿g = 0:75. We consider two values for the discount factor of the politician
￿ = 0:95 and ￿ = 0:9. Government expenditure is set equal to g = 0:1 in each
period. Figure 1 shows the results of this numerical example. It depicts the path
of capital taxes in the best SPEs for the two di⁄erent values of ￿ and the path of
capital taxes in the corresponding Ramsey economy.9
The two solid lines in Figure 1 depict the best SPE corresponding to ￿ = 0:95
and to ￿ = 0:9. In the ￿rst case, the tax on capital converges to zero as predicted
by Proposition 4. However, the convergence is slower than in the corresponding
Ramsey economy, where there is only one period of positive taxation. In fact, in
the best SPE, capital taxes are at ￿rst as high as 20% compared to taxes less than
10% in the corresponding Ramsey equilibria.
When ￿ = 0:9, so that the politician is more impatient than the citizens, capital
taxes again start relatively high and decline over time, but do not converge to zero.
9To make the Ramsey economy comparable to the setup with political sustainability con-
straints, we take the amount of government expenditure to be xt+g at time t, where the sequence
fxtg is the one generated by the best SPE for the same parameter values. This is the reason why
Ramsey equilibria are di⁄erent depending on the value of ￿.
17Figure 1: The best SPE and Ramsey equilibria for di⁄erent values of ￿.
18In this case, the limiting value of capital taxes is about 3.5%. This computation
therefore shows that a relatively small di⁄erence between the discount factors of
politicians and citizens leads to positive long-run capital taxes, which is again
consistent with the patterns implied by Proposition 4. It is also useful to note that
a lower discount factor for the politician does not necessarily imply that capital
taxes will be uniformly higher. The ￿gure shows that with ￿ = 0:95, capital taxes
start out higher than in the economy with ￿ = 0:9, and only fall below those in
the ￿ = 0:9 economy in later periods.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the neoclassi-
cal growth model under the assumption that taxes are controlled by self-interested
politicians who cannot commit. Politicians, in turn, can be removed from power
by citizens via elections. As in the standard (Ramsey) dynamic taxation models,
our environment only allows linear taxes on capital and labor income. The cel-
ebrated Chamley-Judd result shows that, with benevolent governments with full
commitment power, long-run capital taxes should be equal to zero. Since this re-
sult relies on the existence of a benevolent government that is able to commit to
a complete sequence of (future) tax policies, one may conjecture that the presence
of self-interested politicians unable to commit to future taxes will lead to positive
long-run capital taxes.
We showed that the long-run capital tax is indeed positive when politicians
are more impatient than the citizens. In this case, the marginal cost of additional
savings for the citizens is higher in equilibrium than in the undistorted alloca-
tion, because a greater level of the capital stock of the economy will increase the
politician￿ s temptation to deviate and thus necessitates greater rents to the politi-
cian to satisfy the political sustainability constraint. However, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, when politicians are as patient as, or more patient than, the citi-
zens, we established that the political sustainability constraint eventually becomes
slack and long-run capital taxes converge to zero. Our analysis, therefore, shows
that the standard dynamic ￿scal policy results may have wider applicability than
previously recognized. Perhaps more importantly, they also suggest considerable
caution in using these results in more realistic environments without a benevolent,
all-powerful social planner. If, as many studies of political economy suggest, politi-
cians are more short-sighted than citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium
involves positive taxes on capital, even in the long run.
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